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Boundary-making in Istria is an old undertaking. It has actually never ceasesed, not even today. Istrian 
peninsula has thus undergone substantial boundary shifts during the last couple of centuries (especially after the 
Venetian demise in 1797). But Istria carries its worldwide fame also due to one of probably the harshest disputes 
on the post-war European grounds – the Trieste territory dispute. In author's perspective, this dispute is one of 
the four main corner-stones of the current Slovenian-Croatian boundary dispute. The remaining three include 
the Kozler's boundary around Dragonja (Rokava) River, the ungraspable notions of Austrian censuses in Istria, 
and the narratives of partisan settlements on military jurisdiction. However, there are other very important 
aspects which significantly shaped the development of the dispute, but we will focus at assessing the importance
of the aforementioned ones. In this sense, the analysis of the effects of the outcome of the Trieste dispute and its 
implications to the contemporary interstate dispute is set forth. By unveiling its material and consequently its 
psychological effects upon the contemporary bilateral relations, its analyses simultaneously reveals backgrounds 
of never answered question, why Kozler's proposed linguistic boundary around Dragonja (Rokava) River turned 
out to become a boundary of national character. Though nowadays disputed, there is absolutely no chance 
for both involved parties to substantially draw away from once decisively drawn line of a layman. Despite the 
fierce battle of words in Slovenian public media on whether should the interstate boundary be placed on Mirna
(Quieto) or Dragonja Rivers, it will be argued here that the actual choice of the Valley of Dragonja as a boundary 
is by all means Slovenian. The arguments are based on extensive analyses of cartographic materials, relevant 
literature, documents, and statistical data. 
Key words: boundaries, boundary disputes, Triest/Trieste/Trst, Dragonja/Dragogna, Mirna/Quieto, Slovenia, 
Croatia, Italy, North Adriatic, Istria
Određivanje granica u Istri je stari pothvat. Ustvari, nije prestao čak ni danas. U posljednjih nekoliko 
stoljeća granice na istarskom poluotoku doživjele su značajne promjene (posebice nakon propasti Mletačke 
Republike 1797. godine). No Istra je također zbog prijepora oko teritorija Trsta nadaleko poznata kao jedno 
od problematičnijih graničnih područja u Europi u poslijeratnom razdoblju. Prema mišljenju autora, ovaj 
problem je jedan od četiriju glavnih suvremenih graničnih problema između Slovenije i Hrvatske. Ostala tri 
su Kozlerova granica oko rijeke Dragonje (Rokave), nejasni pojmovi u austrijskim popisima u Istri, te priče 
o partizanskim naseljima pod vojnom upravom. No postoje i drugi važni aspekti koji su značajno utjecali na 
razvoj ovoga spora, ali u ovom radu pozornost će biti usmjerena na prije navedene probleme. U skladu s time 
analiziraju se učinci ishoda spora oko tršćanskog teritorija i njihov utjecaj na suvremene granične probleme. 
Upozoravanjem na materijalne i psihološke učinke ovoga spora na suvremene bilateralne odnose te njegovom 
1 The article is a result of the work conducted within a joint 
inter-institutional project on Slovenian-Croatian border 
financed by the Slovenian Research Agency (SRA) and headed
by Dr. Marko Zajc at Institute of Contemporary History. 
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Introduction
"It was a nice and sunny day. For the last time, 
an old Partisan commandant called Franc went 
to his battalion to collect the remaining men for 
a decisive attack on Trieste. His combat unit was 
50-men strong. The battle-scarred heroes knew 
this was the final blow and the city was going to be
liberated, and be Slovenian again. Trieste is ours! At 
last and for good! It was 6th of November 2009..." 
One would place such a novelistic overture rather 
in the period around the end of the World War 
Two. But he or she would be mistaken. A sketched 
scenario was authored by a Slovenian student of 
cinematography, Mr. Žiga Virc. Perhaps inspired 
by the recently issued book "Trieste is Ours" 
(Pirjevec, 2007) he filmed the half an hour short
movie on the conquest of Trieste in 2009. The 
movie pictures an old former Partisan soldier who 
has constantly had those dreams of conquering 
Trieste once and for all. After decades of "living 
in another world", he decided one day to unite 
his comrades once again and go for a final stroke.
His martyr's ambition was stopped by the regular 
Slovenian police squad, which he had eventually 
confused with the German enemies, and a fierce
battle to the last man broke out.
The symptoms the movie implies, let alone the 
wondrous story, are important in our case and 
ought to be scrutinized. They are a translation or an 
echo of the "lost story" into the presence. Shooting 
a militant movie on an imaginary conquest of the 
city of Trieste in the 21st century – more than 
60 years after the WWII – despite the expected 
2 On 5th of November 2009, one day before the film's official
première (sic!), Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Franco Frattini, promptly responded in a same aggravating 
manner: "I am, frankly, astonished by the Slovenian 
Academy's decision to fund the film "Trieste è nostra" 
(Trieste is ours) and by the state television /.../ to broadcast 
it. By recalling the suffering and the experiences /.../ as 
a result of the horrible deeds of the Yugoslav dictator's 
negative acceptance in Italy2 is a clear evidence for 
that. Furthermore, it reveals the Slovenian trauma 
of the loss of Trieste in heads of rank and file as
well as of those "in charge". This translation is 
manifold. First, it was translated into the story of 
an ongoing production and reproduction of the 
myth called Slovenian Trieste (cf. e.g. Babič, 1986: 
58, 404), accompanied by the rivalling myth of the 
Slavic savages endangering the city of Trieste and 
Italy itself (cf. Ballinger, 2003: 37–38), which 
persisted throughout the second half of the 20th 
century and well into the 21st. And second, it was 
gradually translated into the emerging Slovenian-
Croatian dispute after the break-up of former 
Yugoslavia. This translation slowly encroached 
into Slovenian public opinion as both Slovenia and 
Croatia as independent states realized that they 
possess unsolved boundary issues that burden the 
bilateral relations between the two. 
But the way the translation was operationalized 
is mutatis mutandis symptomatic from at least 
one more aspect. Namely, it was transformed to 
become the curtain-fire for the massive territorial
(ethnographically speaking predominantly 
Slovenian) concessions to Italy. Bearing in mind 
that when settling the border between Italy and 
Yugoslavia in 1954, and more definitely by the
Treaty of Osimo in 1975, Slovenia felt as the 
republic, which gave up the most of its population 
and territory in order to win the maximum 
for Yugoslavia in Istria since the delimitation 
between Italy and Yugoslavia roughly followed 
the principle of an "ethnic equilibrium". On the 
contrary, following an "ethnic principle" some 
gangs, this film rubs fresh salt into wounds". Thus he
supported a harsh response already made by Massimiliano 
Lacota of the rightist Union of the Istrians (Unione degli 
Istriani), one of the major optant organizations in Trieste 




analizom također se otkriva pozadina nikad odgovorenog pitanja – zašto je lingvistička granica oko Rijeke 
Dragonje (Rokave) koju je predložio Kozler postala granica od nacionalnog značenja. Iako je danas navedena 
granica često osporavana, teško je očekivati da će obje strane odustati od granice koju je jednom odredio laik. 
Unatoč snažnim prijeporima u slovenskim javnim medijima vezanim uz pitanje treba li međudržavna granica 
biti na rijekama Mirni i Dragonji, u radu je utvrđeno da je izbor granice u dolini rijeke Dragonje zapravo 
slovenski. Argumenti se temelje na opsežnoj analizi kartografskih materijala, relevantne literature, dokumenata 
i statističkih podataka.
Ključne riječi: granice, granični sporovi, Triest/Trieste/Trst, Dragonja/Dragogna, Mirna/Quieto, Slovenija, 
Hrvatska, sjeverni Jadran, Istra
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preceding local bilateral agreements (especially 
the interwar oral agreement of 1944)3 between the 
Slovenian and Croatian part were the Yugoslav 
territorial gains in Istria by its major part allocated 
to Croatia. Ten years after, Slovenia realized that 
the targeted western territories (Trieste, Gorizia, 
Slavia Veneta, Valcanale etc.) were not to be 
integrated into the new Yugoslavia. Facing this 
discrepancy, it became highly unsatisfied with the
outcomes of the new delimitations with both Italy 
(as a Yugoslav republic) and Croatia respectively, 
but remained quiet4.
We mentioned that Trieste, here, played another 
important role. This time around the notion of 
Trieste figured as a metaphor for all the Slovene-
speaking territory perceived to be ceded to Italy. 
Precisely this extension of its notion rendered 
"Trieste" a burning symbol of national sorrow5 
and exploitable means for justification in times to
come after the Slovenian independence. 
These mythical extensions of "the lost Trieste"6, 
had germinated over the three post-war decades. 
Initially it had burst during the first Trieste Crisis7 
in 1945, then by the second in 1953, and the very 
next year with the dissolution of the Free Territory 
of Trieste (FTT), to be partly exhausted by the 
definite loss according to the Treaty of Osimo in
1975. In a way, fortunately, the emerging Yugoslav 
political and economic crises following Josip Broz 
Tito's death and resulting in its dissolution have not 
preceded the treaties from Osimo. It was not until 
1991 that the Trieste's symbolism was successfully 
translated into the upcoming Slovenian-Croatian 
border dispute. By that time "the wound suffered 
by the Slovene nation" opened fully and wide 
(Mihelič, 2007: 151, n. 90). 
The former internal bilateral disagreements 
between Slovenia and Croatia on the boundary 
line in Istria around Dragonja River accompanied 
by the contemporary dispute on an access to the 
international maritime waters rose to international 
level. Here, the translation of the Trieste case took 
another swing, since it was used as a basis for 
Slovenian argument for the "historical debt" of 
Croatia. It is seen as Croatia should be thankful to 
Slovenia for being rewarded with the major part of 
Istria on the account of Slovenes (then Yugoslavs) 
left within the Italian state, or better "left behind", 
as a result of the so-called new ethnic equilibrium. 
Slovenia, accordingly, expects that Croatia settle 
its "moral bill"8 and allow for a "fair" solution 
of the boundary dispute. It has been henceforth 
maintained unquestionable that Slovenia does 
possess the access to the high seas, and that the 
four hamlets9 on Dragonja's left bank along with 
the lot, house, and property of Mr. Joško Joras10 
do belong to Slovenia. Moreover, certain civic and 
political movements arose, which set territorial 
claims southwards to Mirna (Quieto) River or 
even as much as to the whole Istrian peninsula 
in order to render a just repartition that would 
compensate the territories lost to Italy11. On top of 
it, some scientific argumentation became strained
to the point when few researchers argued that the 
inclusion of the Slovene dominated coast between 
3 The military agreement among the local Slovene and 
Croat Partisans from February 1944 is going to be 
addressed later on.
4 cf. Zwitter's and Ude's opinions cited in e.g. Mihelič, 
2007: 88, 90-91, n. 51. 
5 See especially the leading Slovenian historian B. Grafenauer 
and his thoughts of 1993 (cited in MIHELIČ, 2007: 150-
151). 
6 The term is invented to counterpart the heavily pounding 
metaphor "Trst je naš" (i.e. Trieste is ours) (cf. PIRJEVEC, 
2007).
7 Trieste Crisis could also be justifiably named as Trieste
Crises for the continuous fights and tensions at the edge
of an armed conflict (e.g. KACIN-WOHINC, PIRJEVEC, 2000: 
109-112).
8 See also Grafenauer (1993) in Mihelič, 2007: 150. The 
question of morality was prominent even in the official
politics, since Slovenia established the so-called "moral 
commission on Slovenian-Croatian boundary". 
9 Four hamlets are Škrilje-Mlini, Veli Malin, Bužini, and 
Škodelin/Škudelin with some 60 predominantly Slovene 
inhabitants though of multilingual proficiency (e.g. JOSIPOVIČ, 
KRŽIŠNIK-BUKIĆ, 2010: 89–90. The whole disputed territory 
along the Dragonja River occupies about 113.79 hectares 
and is represented by a narrow strip with a perimeter of 
13.68 km (author's estimates). This strip may roughly be 
divided in two portions: (1) western part along the saline 
of Sečovlje/Sicciole with 8.41 km in perimeter and 50.67 
ha; (2) eastern part with 5.68 km in perimeter and 63.12 
ha situated between the bridges at Sečovlje-Mlini and 
Dragonja-Škudelin, respectively. 
10 In Slovenian public media, Joško Joras is renowned as a 
Slovenian fighter for the righteous border in Istria, while
in Croatian media, he is portrayed as a Croatian menace. 
Nevertheless, he was the most prominent of all inhabitants 
of the "Left bank" of Dragonja, for his readiness for 
publicity and for his will to prove his rightfulness. He, 
namely, maintains that he is living on the indisputably 
Slovenian territory.
11 Apart from other less numerous and obscured movements 
with similar programmatic starting points, there is one 
Slovenian parliamentary party (Slovene People's Party) 
claiming the same. Closely connected to SPP is the Institute 
25th of June, which is led by the former SPP president, Mr. 
Marjan Podobnik (see e.g. KRNEL-UMEK, 2005). 
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Štivan (S. Giovanni) and Barkovlje (Barcola)12 
of the former Zone A of FTT would alone grant 
Slovenia the access to the high sea (e.g. Kalc-
Hafner, 2005: 34–36). 
It is, therefore, understandable that the 
boundaries set in the post-war period raised 
lots of problems for the populations involved, 
to begin only with the militarization and hostile 
propaganda along with the forced and pseudo-
voluntary migration (after Josipovič, 2006: 
88–89). In addition, it is immensely difficult
to handle the masses once they have had been 
shifted from one place to another in order to 
escape or to survive terror. It is very hard, though 
heavily needed, to deliver and to disseminate 
more meticulous explanations to prevent "the 
Furious" from avenging the scapegoat at hand, 
so easily found within all sorts of minorities, be 
it in the place of resettlement or in original places. 
Still, the elected state authorities, or putschist 
powers that be respectively, often driven by the 
same forces as nationalist movements in times of 
creating an independent state, cannot escape such 
developments. This holds true for both Slovenia 
and Croatia. 
Hypothesis and methods
Being led by the awareness of such possible 
austerities, the author argues that specific
geopolitical relationships and historical course 
of the events, including the creation of the buffer 
state of Free Territory of Trieste, either narrowed 
or prevented other possible solutions (i.e. different 
of those applied) as far as the internal delimitation 
between Slovenes and Croats in Istria is concerned. 
The role of contemporary psychological 
translation of the loss of Trieste for Slovenia over 
its stance towards Croatia is examined as well. It is 
furthermore argued that the diachronic perspective 
may often blur the view upon circumstances of a 
given historical issue, since this method hardly 
considers all the relevant events responsible for 
specific historical developments. In this way, the
demographic situation in the Zone A of FTT 
was closely scrutinized in order to understand 
the quantitative extent of Slovenian demographic 
cession to Italy. Similarly, the area between 
Dragonja and Mirna Rivers was closely analysed 
from the point of view of official Austrian statistics
in order to question the rationalizations for then 
Slovenian official insisting on Dragonja River as an
"ethnic" boundary between Slovenes and Croats 
of Istria. Finally, the author argues that a decade 
long international procrastination of solving the 
FTT knot rendered the existing temporary mutual 
delimitation between Slovenian and Croatian side 
irreversibly fixed and irreparable. Furthermore,
the Slovenian historical deprivation of its western, 
nowadays Italian, territories drove Slovenia into 
via facti urging Croatia for giving up its territory. 
Hence, the issue of the lost Trieste reappropriatedly 
translated into the bilateral negotiations between 
Slovenia and Croatia lessened the opportunities to 
bilateral solution of the dispute, and terminally led 
into the need of an outer arbitration.
To answer this set of questions and to test the 
arguments set afore, the study involved methods 
spanning from the pure quantitative analyses 
of statistical and demographic data on Austrian 
censuses in the period 1880–1910 to cartographical 
methods of producing a set of thematic maps. 
Apart of the above-mentioned, the interpretational-
hermeneutic methods of analysing historical 
cartographic materials, relevant literature, and 
documents were used. 
Some historical backgrounds of Trieste crisis  
in relation to Slovenian-Croatian delimitation  
in Istria
 
To understand the contemporary dispute between 
Slovenia and Croatia we shall have to return to the 
period after the Italian capitulation in September 
1943 and to the area of Trieste and northern Istria. 
Here, the history and the space are so condensed 
that we may speak of the specific "thickness of time-
space compression", to intertwine and paraphrase 
both Saskia Sassen (e.g. 1999) and David Harvey 
(e.g. 1989). Thickness itself may be perceived in a 
number of meanings. With the thickness here, we 
refer to the numerous events happening so rapidly 
that their temporal density was ungraspable to both 
decision-makers and sheer populations involved. 
The time-space compression used in this text deviate 
from what was originally elaborated by Harvey's 
(e.g. 1989: 240) notion aiming at the "processes 
that so revolutionize the objective qualities of space 
and time that we are forced to alter [...] how we 
represent the world to ourselves". Instead, we apply 
12 Barkovlje (Barcola ital.) was one of the many Slovene-
speaking villages at the doorstep of Trieste. As the city was 
growing it has spatially been swallowing these settlements 
and rendering them into its mere suburbs with growing 
share of Italian-speakers (cf. e.g. MELIK, 1960: 110). 
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the apparatus to define the circumstances in which
the space and time are revolutionary concentrated 
in a given place and time-frame, since in the case of 
wartime we are, rather expectedly, not dealing with 
something postmodern but more likely with some 
pre-modern phenomena. This idea might be closer 
to rephrased notion of time-space compression. 
Though she criticized it, Doreen Massey (1993) 
reformulated it and proposed the use of the "power-
geometry" as more flexible and encompassing
theoretical tool for grasping the relations between 
individuals, groups and their places. Though both 
theorems aim at understanding the contemporaneity 
of the world dynamics, both are equipped with the 
ability of assessing the historical events and are 
applicable to those. 
To return to the case of FTT and the immediate 
aftermaths of WWII the pertinent idea of the 
"thickness of time-space compression" refers to the 
circumstances and events in times and places of the 
Trieste crises. Applying this dialectical apparatus 
here, bringing together the converging issues of 
ending the world war, of creating the FTT, along with 
the external, internal, and sub-divisional delimitation 
of FTT and the Zone B respectively, topped by the 
underlying ideological views on Slovenian and 
Croatian identities, may help us understand the 
evolution and the climax of the Slovenian-Croatian 
dispute, and, finally, its cession to the arbitration
tribunal. As regards the contemporary boundary 
dispute, the whole historical thickness within a very 
small portion of ground may be epitomized in as 
little as a single person: for example in Joško Joras' 
fight for his right. This is, of course, exaggeration,
but in minds of lay public, Joras is a personification
of a man who would risk his life in order to prove 
his right. This symbolism was until recently a very 
important fuel for more nationalist options to gain 
additional votes on elections13. However, owing to 
abundant pertinent literature it is not the aim of 
this paper to go into depth of all broached issues. 
Instead, it will enlighten those initial and crucial 
coinciding chain-events, which contributed to the 
complexity of contemporary Slovenian-Croatian 
boundary dispute.
In mid- 20th century, the city of Trieste carried 
a world-wide fame not only due to its picturesque 
landscapes, variegated population, or colourful 
history but rather for its flourishing economy
as for being the famous "k. u. k." port of the 
Hapsburg Empire. After the WWI Trieste retained 
its demographic potential but it also suffered the 
economic consequences of geopolitical changes at 
its eastern peripheries, so it gradually reoriented 
from transportation role to a whole range of 
industries. After the Italian capitulation in 1943 and 
after the Nazi defeat in 1945, the city's importance 
turned out to be of outmost interest for allying 
counterparts. Both, the Western Allies, especially 
the British, and Tito's Partisans saw the city at 
least as part of their ideological influential sphere
if not as their dependencies, let alone the economic 
and transportation potential equipped with good 
connections with the hinterland. The former did 
so for their agreement with Stalin, and the latter 
for its potential geopolitical and economic power 
of the new socialist state. It was not unexpectedly, 
though, that the city was then proclaimed to be one 
of the three danger-spots of Southeastern Europe 
(e.g. Seton-Watson, 1951: 347). 
In the eyes of the Yugoslavs, especially the 
Slovenes, Trieste was seen as the major access 
to Adriatic Sea, and one of the future centres in 
both economic and political terms of the Slovene 
entity within the Yugoslav federation (cf. e.g. 
Troha, 1999: 23). Moreover, Trieste was seen as 
the fair prize for more than two decades of Italian 
occupation and fascist terror in western Slovenian 
region of Primorska (The Littoral)14. Given that it 
was clear by 1947 that Venetian Slovenia (Slavia 
13 See footnote 10 and 11. The case of Joško Joras is 
interesting from another point of view. The worsening 
of bilateral relations in times before elections may 
be contributed to political appropriations of a single 
person. Misuse and victimization of Joras's cause met 
its counterpart in a shape of politicians. Namely, the 
president of Slovenian People's Party (SPP), Mr. Janez 
Podobnik, brother of Marjan Podobnik, was arrested 
by Croatian border police at the eve of 2004 elections 
in Slovenia. The tapping scandal of the same year when 
media reported that Croatian Prime Minister Sanader 
and the future Slovenian Prime Minister Janša allegedly 
organized provocations in Piran Bay in order for 
Slovenian Democratic Party to win the election. Political 
analysts commented then that SPP managed to enter the 
parliament by votes of the more militant population 
thanks to the provocation at the Sečovlje/Plovanija 
border-crossing in 2004.
14 Primorska or "Littoral" is the western-most Slovene-
speaking area. It is perceived as the territory lying westward 
of the former Rapallo boundary, between the Valcanale 
and Fiume on the east and Adriatic on the west. There 
is no firm evidence of defining it neither territorially nor
ethnically. Though after the WWII, the Yugoslav newly 
incorporated territories formerly under Italian occupation 
were split between Slovenia and Croatia. While Slovenian 
part was called Slovensko Primorje (i.e. Slovenian Littoral), 
the Croatian part retained its historical name Istria since 
the name Hrvatsko Primorje (i.e Croatian Littoral) was 
traditionally used for the Adriatic coast roughly between 
Rijeka/Fiume and Karlobag (e.g. BERTIĆ, 1987: 123; cf. also 
an interesting view of PAVIĆ, 2010).
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Veneta / Slavia Furlana), Valcanale (Kanalska 
dolina), and Gorica (Gorizia) including Gradiška 
(Gradisca) with about 35,000, 2,000, and 28,000 
Slovenes respectively (e.g. Stranj, 1999: 230; cf. 
Rutar, 1899: 59; de Courtenay, 1998: 50) would 
all remain under Italy. Thus only about one half 
(i.e. 60,000) of Italian Slovenes would eventually 
remain within the Yugoslav "Seventh Republic"15 
(cf. e.g. Dukovski, 2011). Furthermore, Trieste was 
an embodiment of the first anti-fascist movement
in Europe well before the outbreak of the World 
War Two called the TIGR16 movement. Thus its 
firm material value blended with the symbolic and
heavily contributed to its political meaning. 
Prior to Italian occupation of Trieste and 
Primorska after the First World War and after the 
Rapallo Treaty was signed, Trieste was cultural, 
economic and political centre of the Littoral 
Slovenes. Apart from immigration to the city from 
its karstic hinterland, the Slovenes exercised strong 
historical ties with the city. Prior to the introduction 
of the Southern railway connecting Vienna with the 
Adriatic in 1857, the city of Trieste used to be of 
lesser importance. Since then, it had been growing 
rapidly. By the last Austrian census in 1910 the city 
itself reached 160,000 inhabitants17. Anticipating 
the outbreak of a great war aiming at redrawing 
the political map of Europe, the city already 
suffered alterations of census results in favour of 
Italian-speaking community. The Austrian census 
commission in Vienna eventually inspected the 
results. Those were consequently "repaired" 
although slightly tailored upon the Austrian 
wishes (cf. Roglić, 1946: 48). Yet, the situation 
was complicated since the city of Trieste built up 
its own administrative municipality comprised of 
the city proper, the suburbs, and the outskirts (see 
Tab. 1 and Fig. 1). 
Adding some 12,000 Slovenes on the high 
plateau and surrounding villages which were 
included in the Zone A (cf. Stranj, 1999: 330), 
the number of Slovene-speaking population 
in and around the city was about 70,000 (see 
Tab. 1 and Fig. 1). Henceforth, the census of 
1910 provided the ground for later Slovene (and 
Yugoslav) demands over the city. The Slovenes 
dominated the major part of territory, while the 
Italians concentrated in the city core area (Fig. 
1). As already mentioned, the city grew almost 
exclusively on the account of immigration, but 
the immigrants were predominantly Slovenes. 
The city's demography radically changed over the 
last century or so. From a small town around the 
hill of San Giusto, Trieste developed into a city 
stretching all the way to karstic piedmont. While 
the karstic high plateau of what later became 
the Trieste Province was exclusively inhabited 
by Slovenes, the Slovene-speaking areas gained 
ground in the suburbs at flysch foothills except
in the sole city centre (cf. Kalc-Hafner et 
al., 2005). Emphasizing close interdependency 
between the city and its hinterland, some Slovenes 
already saw Trieste as their future capital city 
(cf. Melik, 1960: 17–18). The outbreak of the 
First World War and the Italian seizure of both 
the city and the vast eastern territory "shattered 
the Slovenian dreams". Followed by the fascist 
oppression and violence during the Second World 
War, the region of Primorska saw the birth of 
strong antifascist movement, which evolved in 
massive admissions to the Partisan forces. After 
the Mussolini's capitulation and Hitler's demise, 
the Slovenes saw themselves already as the rulers 
of the city, notwithstanding about 40,000 Slovene 
emigrants escaping the fascist terror (e.g. Stranj, 
1999: 304). Nonetheless, the historical course of 
events was different. 
There are several reasons why the city of 
Trieste, or what was later known as the Zone A of 
the Free Territory of Trieste (FTT), was ceded to 
Italy in the aftermath of the Trieste crisis. Initially, 
the Trieste was subject to fierce race between
eastern and western allies, as to who would be 
the first to conquer the city following the turmoil
after the withdrawal of German troops in April 
1945 (cf. e.g. Glenny, 1999: 533). Following his 
obsession to display the power of his Partisans 
and independence from Stalin, Tito invested every 
single resource available to be the first of the
allies to enter the city. Despite the exhausting and 
time-consuming south-eastern route to the city 
of Trieste, he rushed his combatants through the 
rough karstic landscape of Istria, to eventually 
snatch the city right in front of the New Zealand 
troops which have been approaching the city from 
the western flatlands of the Padus River. Lacking
15 This "Seventh Republic" was intended to receive "the 
status of separate state in the Yugoslav federation." 
(underlined in BALLINGER: 83–84)
16 TIGR is an abbreviation for Trieste, Istria, Gorizia, Rijeka, 
the regions occupied by Italy after the World War One, and 
alluding to the power of a tiger. This abbreviation reveals 
the quandary over the unifying name (cf. the note above).
17 Allgemeines Verzeichnis der Ortsgemeinden und 
Ortschaften Österreichs, Vienna, 1915. 
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Stalin's support, Tito was forced to relinquish 
this strategically very important "gates of North 
Adriatic" to the British about forty days after the 
conquest (Troha, 1999: 24). 
Why the Trieste territory dispute and the loss of 
Trieste was a failure for Socialist Yugoslavia? The 
answer is far from being simple. To some degree, 
we might exploit a crosscut explanation according 
to which the Western Allies feared Tito's control 
over the strategically important city as a potential 
risk for Stalin's intervention and establishment of 
a Soviet naval base (Glenny, 1999: 533). In this 
sense, Tito and his comrades never convincingly 
presented the counter-arguments, inasmuch 
as the latter were plausible to effect the Yalta 
negotiations in February 1945 and the "fifty-
fifty" accord (Glenny, 1999: 522-523). To be 
precise, the Soviet sway across the Eastern and 
Central Europe in the spring of 1945 dramatically 
changed the geopolitical balance in favour of the 
Soviets. Thus the proposed "fifty-fifty" solutions
for Yugoslavia and Hungary never worked out. 
Instead, the Trieste issue became the geopolitical 
hot-spot which shined for decades to come. 
Table 1 Colloquial languages in the city of Trieste according to the Austrian census of 1910
Italian col. language Slovene col. language Other languages TOTAL
City Proper 95,385 60.14% 19,684 12.41% 43,532 27.45% 158,601
Suburbs 22,691 38.11% 28,359 47.62% 8,497 14.27% 59,547
Outskirts/Plateau 538 6.00% 8,199 91.40% 233 2.60% 8,970
Total municipality 118,614 52.23% 56,242 24.76% 52,262 23.01% 227,118
Figure 1 Colloquial languages in 1910, quantitative relationships, the city of Trieste and its quarters
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Boundaries of FTT and delimitation  
between the zones A and B
The Free Territory of Trieste was crescent-
shaped coastal buffer zone occupying the coast 
between the two firths, that of Timava/Timavo on
northern extremity and that of Mirna/Quieto on 
the southern, respectively. It was divided by the so-
called Morgan Line into two unequal halves. The 
smaller but densely populated Zone A with the city 
of Trieste, and the bigger though less populated 
Zone B (Fig. 2). 
While there was a lot of discussion on the 
delimitation between the two zones, there was much 
less emphasis on the internal administrative (sub-
) divisions. The division had changed despite the 
strong suggestions on keeping the administrative 
boundaries as they were prior to the war (Marin, 
1998). The so-called principle of untouchable 
administrative boundaries was first violated by the
Allies themselves. Namely the Morgan Line, which 
was to divide the former zones A and B18, was 
drawn in a manner which uncompromisingly cut 
through the landscapes of former Görz/Goriška 
Land from the Upper Soča/Isonzo valley all the way 
to Valle Oltra on Muggia/Milje peninsula (cf. e.g. 
the title map in Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjevec, 2000; 
e.g. Ballinger, 2003; Fig. 4, p. 87). In 1947, when 
The Free Territory of Trieste was established, the 
Morgan Line was used as its internal delimitation. 
Both Zone A and Zone B shrank to the coastal 
area between Timavo/Timav and Quieto/Mirna 
Rivers and thus preserving the Morgan Line as 
their common delineator. 
The logic behind such a strange shaping of FTT 
was to provide a land corridor from Monfalcone/
Tržič to Trieste and towards Italian-speaking area 
between Muggia/Milje and Cittànova/Novigrad 
(Fig. 2). Besides encompassing the railway line 
and the road between Trieste and Monfalcone, 
the corridor encapsulated almost entirely Slovene-
speaking coastal area between San Giovanni/
Štivan and Barcola/Barkovlje consisted of 
municipalities Duino-Aurisina/Devin-Nabrežina, 
Sgonico/Zgonik, and Rupinogrande/Repentabor. 
The eastern borders of those three municipalities 
have been reshaped to conform to the low karstic 
ridge between Medvedjak (475m) the Hill 323 
(see Fig. 2). Thus they lost substantial parts of 
their former territories. Correspondingly, the 
city of Trieste retained its administrative division 
from the Hapsburg period throughout the fascist 
era until 1947 when the locality of Lipica with 
about 100 inhabitants was excluded of the Zone 
A and annexed directly to Slovenia or Yugoslavia 
respectively. Thus the Zone A boundary followed 
the aforementioned ridge from Medvedjak to Hill 
667 (see Fig. 2). Both remaining municipalities 
to the south, Muggia/Milje and Dolina, were 
trimmed too. Municipality of Dolina was 
enlarged by Grozzana/Gročana, a former part of 
Klanec-Očisla Municipality, while being curtailed 
of Plavje/Plavia and Osp/Ospo. Similarly, the 
Municipality of Muggia/Milje was diminished by 
parts of Monti/Hribi, Valle Oltra/Valdoltra, and 
Škofije/Scoffie.
The Yugoslav and Slovenian side inclusively, 
was under enormous pressure in the period 
1945-1954. The permanent crisis about the FTT 
slowly started to emerge. The preoccupation 
gradually transformed into an obsession with 
the Trieste question and Trieste itself. During 
the whole period of existence of FTT, the 
Yugoslav side tried out several proposition of 
redrawing the map of Trieste and its vicinity. 
As it slowly became unreasonable to expect the 
repossession of Trieste proper, the Yugoslavs 
(especially Slovenes) tried with other so-to-
say "substitutional proposals". Among the 
latter, there was a proposed recollection of the 
Slovene dominated coast between S. Giovanni/
Štivan and Barcola/Barkovlje in exchange for 
the Trieste proper and other Italian-speaking 
towns of the Zone B. This proposal was a direct 
proof of how strongly the Yugoslavs feared that 
the establishment of a land corridor between 
Monfalcone/Tržič and Trieste/Trst could have 
been only a rehearsal for a later inclusion of 
the whole FTT into the Italian Republic. Ana 
Kalc-Hafner (2005: 34–36), for instance, argues 
that Kardelj's and Bebler's interventions in 
1951 and 1952 have proved Yugoslav interest 
particularly for the strip between Monfalcone/
Tržič and Trieste/Trst as well as for the south-
eastern suburbs of Trieste, for example Škedenj/
Servola and Žavlje/Aquilinia (ibid.). All these 
interventions were, accordingly, fruitless. 
18 In years 1945 and 1946 the Allies have already demarcated 
the former Venezia Giulia (The Julian March) into three 
zones. While Zone C (aproximately the Province of Udine/
Viden) was put directly under the Italian jurisdiction, 
the eastern part of former Julian March was assigned to 
Yugoslav occupational forces and transformed into the 
Zone B, and the central part was administered by the 
Western Allies as the Zone A. So by 1947 the Morgan's line 
within FTT was only a remnant of formerly much longer 
delimitation line. 
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Figure 2 The Free Territory of Trieste on Ivan Selan's map of Slovenian Littoral (1952)
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From the aforesaid could, however, be deduced 
that the Slovenian component of the Yugoslav side 
had only wanted the ethnically Slovene inhabited 
access to the sea per se to approve the Slovenian 
historical ties to the sea19. Otherwise there would 
have been no valid explanation, why had the 
Yugoslav side offered a predominantly Italian-
speaking town of Koper (Capodistria) in exchange 
for a tiny village of Aquilinia/Žavlje (cf. Kalc-
Hafner, 2005: 34–36). Interests for other ways of 
compensations were not on the table. This might 
be the main clue for understanding, why has the 
Slovenian side released its interest from what was 
later become known as the Buje district in the 
Zone B. One could thus infer that the area of Buje/
Buie was not Slovene enough to bother with and to 
raise questions about it.
In the meantime, the Yugoslav administered 
Istrian County (the whole Zone B) was 
transformed into Koper and Buje Districts with 
Dragonja River as its internal demarcation 
line (see Fig. 2). The reluctance of Slovenes to 
firmly intervene in the Zone B and its internal
delimitation between the Croatian and Slovenian 
part could be on one hand ascribed to the 
ongoing dispute over Trieste proper. On the other 
hand, the Slovenian side perhaps considered 
the question of internal delimitation irrelevant 
as long as the Zone B is under the Yugoslav 
administration. For the Slovenian behaviour, 
though, there might be a third reason as well: 
knowing that the Slovenian administration of the 
northern part of Zone B (the Koper/Capodistria 
District) with the predominantly Italian-speaking 
coastal towns is still uncertain might have given 
rise to a kind of dissatisfaction when winning 
the war but not having the coast of your own. 
As proposed above, the interiorization of the so-
called natural law in the political and diplomatic 
thought as far as the Slovenian side is concerned 
may render an answer or further understanding of 
the Slovenian stance towards the Croatian allies 
(Josipovič, 2011). And there is one more reason: 
questioning the internal delimitation of the Zone 
B might have endangered good relations between 
the Yugoslavs, as well as it might have been 
considered as too particularistic and sectarian 
for the leadership and for the Communist Party 
itself. The leading Slovene communists were 
therefore feared of being accused for jeopardising 
the "achievements of the socialist revolution" 
(cf. e.g. Mihelič, 2007: 97). The ill-amusement 
with the Trieste question, which had happened 
to be already assigned to the Italians, exhausted 
the Slovenian side in both energy and time. The 
Allies won the Trieste to Italy with a tactics of 
procrastination. Realizing the loss of Trieste and 
ceding one hundred thousand Slovene-speaking 
inhabitants to Italy, the Slovenian side threw 
the sponge of the Istrian internal delimitation 
up. After the dissolution of FTT in 1954 when 
Yugoslavia was finally rewarded with the former
Zone B, the Slovenian side found itself deeply 
traumatized by losing Trieste but in the very 
same breath believing of gaining it back someday. 
Thus they paralleled the Italian experience of lost 
Istria and the exodus20 (cf. Ballinger, 2003: 61). 
The then contemporary question on Slovenian-
Croatian delimitation stepped aside to the 
national mourning over Trieste. 
Linguistic boundary in Istria – why Kozler's 
Dragogna/Dragogna? 
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked 
that the consequent years brought some 
corrections in the Istrian section of Slovenian-
Croatian boundary, but still no-one raised the 
question of ethnic imbalance. Here, it has to be 
emphasized that the delimitation between the 
Koper and Buje Districts followed the Kozler's 
boundary along the Dragonja/Dragogna River. 
Let us only remind that in 1853 Kozler was the 
first to distinguish the Dragonja/Dragogna River
as more or less clear boundary between Slovenes 
and Croats in Istria. Ever since then, no-one 
raised the question of reasonability of Kozler's 
Taking into account the data of Italian organization for 
Assistance to Refugees and the research in Croatia, recent 
estimates, however, confirm the number of esuli at about 
220,000–225,000 (ibid.). Still, within this number one 
has to distinguish a multi-ethnic composition, though the 
majority of optants were of Italian affiliation. Furthermore,
one has to bear in mind that the numbers of refugees were 
highly disproportionate, as regards the area of origin. 
Hence, between 32,000 and 37,000 persons (15 %) have 
fled from the area controlled by the Slovenian side.
19 The Slovenian long-lasting struggle to grasp the sea is 
neatly wrapped into the subtitle of Pirjevec's (2007) book 
"'Trieste is Ours': A struggle for Sea (1848-1954)".
20 The numbers on the exodus from the Yugoslav controlled 
areas in the period between 1943 and 1955 vary strongly. 
According to some Italian sources, the numbers are as high 
as 350,000 (e.g. BALLINGER, 2003: 44). On the other end, 
there were numbers about 156,000. The latter figure relates,
nevertheless, only to those who emigrated from what was 
administrated by Croatian side (e.g. MANIN, 2006, 86–87). 
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21 Kozler's "Zemljovid" was a kind of concretization of 
the 1848 Slovene national programme called "Zedinjena 
Slovenija" (i.e. Unified Slovenia). For more thorough
discussion on Kozler's delimitation in Istria see Josipovič, 
2011: 236-240.
22 Both Partisan commandants clearly had the credentials to 
mediate the mutual delimitation. There are some evidence 
according to which they followed the instructions of their 
superiors (e.g. GUČEK, 1959: 196–197; MIHELIČ, 2007: 86). 
23 In conversation with the Slovenian geographer Peter 
Repolusk in 2002, he maintained that Kozler intentionally 
did not finish his delimitation until the river mouth of
Dragonja. Instead, he had drawn the delimiting line until 
about 10 km from the then coast in the Piran Bay. This 
argument21. There were only a few more or less 
hushed or overheard voices about the Savudrija 
and Kaštel or about the boundary in Istria more 
generally (e.g. Ude, 1944 in Mihelič, 2007, 
supplement 15; Šepić, 1943 in Kristen, 2006: 
389–398). The speed of delimiting the Zone B 
among the Slovenian and Croatian sides was, 
not necessarily as expected, amazing compared 
to that of the Trieste territory. Here, it will 
be therefore examined, what were the actual 
reasons for such hastiness. Although the ethnic 
picture was far from being simple or unanimous, 
as we shall see, the decision was prompt and it 
cut like a knife. Namely, in February 1944, two 
Partisan commandants, the Slovene Milan Guček 
and the Croat Andrija Babić, set an agreement in 
Malija22, a small village above Piran/Pirano. 
According to the unwritten agreement, the 
dividing line of operation zones between the 
Slovene and the Croat Partisan forces in Istria 
followed the Dragonja River to Topolovec, where 
the dividing line turned to the southeast beneath 
Pregara and above Štrped towards Vodice in 
Ćićarija in north-eastern direction. "As far as the 
boundary is concerned," the commandant Guček 
ruminated in his memoires, "the two of us have 
probably laid the course of future inter-republic 
boundary" (Guček, 1959: 198-202). When he 
was speaking to Babić, Partizan Guček used the 
following argument for such deliberation: "The 
boundary shall be there, where people speak 
distinctly Slovene" (Guček, 1959: 198; emphasis 
by D.J.). Guček adds that "there was no resistance 
from Andrija so we could have agreed easily" 
(ibid.). This is the most stunning evidence of the 
doctrine of purity and the natural law embedded 
in the political discourse of Slovene Partisan 
movement all the way from the 1848 March 
revolution as opposed to the Croatian historical 
law. This stance is a direct consequence of Kozler's 
deliberations on, why should the Dragonja River 
represent the boundary between Slovenes and 
Croats. Guček, on the contrary, could have built 
his argument for instance on tactics, military 
strategy etc. in justifying the Dragonja River as 
a proper boundary between the two operational 
Partisan zones. But neither he nor anyone else has 
not done that, though Kozler had simultaneously 
claimed that he could have also been wrong 
since "there is a vast stretch of transitional area 
between Slovenes and Croats so one could have 
also drawn the line from Bakar (Buccari) to the 
Drava River" (Kozler, 1854: 20)23. 
Evidence from the early (1880–1910) Austrian 
censuses – Dragonja/Dragogna or Mirna/Quieto? 
To understand the development of ethnic 
affiliations in this border section and the long-
term effect of Kozler's reflections we should be 
informed by the Austrian censuses of the period 
between 1880 and 1910. Detailed demographic 
and statistical analysis of the area between the 
rivers of Dragonja and Mirna on one hand, 
and Savudrija and Oprtalj (Portole) on the 
other hand, reveals that the ethnic structure, 
holistically speaking, is more favourable for 
Slovenes compared to Croats. The performed 
analysis includes 116 census measurements 
from the four official Austrian censuses in 1880, 
1890, 1900 and 1910. Compared to Croats, the 
proportion and number of Slovenes were higher 
in more than half of the cases (60:39), and in 
17 cases the result was undecided (source: 
Austrian censuses of the Austro-Illyrian 
Littoral). In general, the Slovenes prevailed 
over the Croats in this, ironically speaking, 
"Mesopotamia Minor". Similar findings hold 
for the area of Buzet, where the statistical 
occurrence of Italianness does not obscure the 
relationships between Slovenes and Croats. 
was confirmed by one of earlier versions of the famous
Kozler's map "Zemljovid Slovenske dežele in pokrajin 
[The Map of Slovene Land and Provinces]" from 1853. 
In later reproductions of Kozler's map, editors forged 
it and "completed" the line until the sea and caused 
thence irreparable "side-effect" of ascribing someone 
the things he or she has never committed. Additional 
evidence which supports this argument is the fact that 
Kozler wrote that: "the boundary goes from Piran along 
the Dragonja River". He could only have meant from 
the border of Piran Municipality including Savudrija and 
Kaštel. Otherwise he would have used: "...from the Piran 
Bay...", or: "from the Adriatic Sea..." instead (emphases 
by D.J.). 
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Since in the pertinent literature the question 
on the prevalence of any (except the Italian) 
"ethnic element" were analytically completely 
overlooked, we carried out an extensive analysis 
of official Austrian statistical data along with
cartographic representations. Since the question of 
newly acquired territory raised the question of its 
repartition and its political inclusion respectively, 
one should bear in mind that the Yugoslav 
(though multilateral) side has won the war and 
the pertinent territories of the Zone B. Following 
the paraphrased principle of cuius natio, eius 
regio it is completely illogical that the Yugoslav 
side never excluded Italians in its deliberations, 
unless we apply the framework of the time-
space compression. Moreover, to produce higher 
numbers of the Yugoslavs in post-war mappings, 
it considered Slovenes and Croats (as well as other 
"Yugoslavs") as a monolith group (e.g. Roglić, 
1946). In this way, all the relationships in a field
were blurred. In our analysis we removed that 
"third party" (i.e. Italians) to avoid the side effect 
of tri-partitioning. It was clear that the whole 
area were dominated by Italian speakers. But 
the question on preponderance of the "winning" 
Slovenes and Croats were never justifiably
answered. Thus we produced four analytical 
maps, which (beside the absolute structure) show 
the relationship between Slovenes and Croats 
alone, and which were created according to the 
official census data on colloquial language from
the period 1880-1910 (Fig. 3, 4, 5, and 6). 
The studied area at the time consisted of 30 
settlements divided into eight municipalities: Umag/
Umago, Buje/Buie, Novigrad/Cittànova, Brtonigla/
Črni-vrh/Verteneglio, Grožnjan/Grisignano, Oprtalj/
Portole, and parts of Piran/Pirano (Savudrija/Salvore 
and Kaštel/Castevenere) and Buzet/Pinguente 
(Pregara) respectively. 
According to the census of 1880, Slovene 
colloquial language dominated in the western 
part of the studied area (in Municipalities of 
Umag, Novigrad, Brtonigla, and in Savudrija and 
Kaštel, as well as in Pregara). While the Oprtalj 
was predominantly Croatian, Buje and Grožnjan 
were varied. Among 30 settlements, 15 (50 %) 
were dominated by Slovene colloquial language 
and Croatian in 12, respectively. In the three (3) 
remaining settlements there were no population 
considered neither as Slovene nor as Croatian 
speakers (Fig. 3).
The 1890 census brought vast predominance 
of Slovene colloquial language in all municipalities 
or in as many as 22 settlements, with Pregara (a 
part of Buzet municipality) as the sole exception. 
Croatian language gained ground only in a few 
small settlements like Brda/Collalto or Čepić/
Ceppi. Again, three settlements were without 
Slovene or Croatian speakers (Fig. 4). 
After the climax of 1890, the number of Slovene 
speakers slowly started to diminish compared to the 
Croatian. Nevertheless, by 1900 it retained overall 
majority. Slovene speakers gained local majority in 
14 settlements while the Croatian did so only in 12 
settlements. At the occasion of this census (1900) 
the Slovene speakers dominated in Municipalities 
of Oprtalj, Brtonigla, Piran (i.e. in Savudrija and 
Kaštel) or prevailed in Municipalities of Grožnjan 
and Umag. According to this census, Croatian 
speakers dominated only in the Municipality of 
Buje (Fig. 5).
In 1910, the Croatian speaking population 
for the first and the last time before the WWI
slightly surpassed the Slovene speakers (13 vs. 10 
settlements). Considering the fact that there were 
no Slovene or Croatian speakers in as many as 
seven settlements (including Umag and Novigrad/
Cittànova, two major coastal towns), one might 
stipulate that the Italian speaking settlements had 
already consolidated against the "Slavs" (Fig. 6). 
To sum up the whole studied area between the 
two rivers, the Slovene speakers directly compared 
to the Croat speakers reached the following 
percentages: 56% in 1880; 81% in 1890; 54% in 
1900; 43% in 1910 (see Tab. 2).
The results show that the area between the 
Dragonja and Mirna Rivers is indeed transitional 
and shifting in affiliations of its population. Thus
it is not surprising that many authors designated 
that area as of "mixed" character (e.g. Berghaus, 
1846; Czoernig, 1855 in Josipovič, 2011). In 
Table 2 Overall majority according to colloquial language in the area between Dragonja and Mirna according to 
Austrian censuses of 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910 
1880 1890 1900 1910 1880-1910
Slovene-speaking population 56 % 81 % 54 % 43 % 58.5 %
Croatian-speaking population 44 % 19 % 46 % 57 % 41.5 %
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Figure 3 Local prevalence of Slovene or Croatian colloquial language (Census of 1880) 
Figure 4 Local prevalence of Slovene or Croatian colloquial language (Census of 1890) 
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Figure 5 Local prevalence of Slovene or Croatian colloquial language (Census of 1900) 
Figure 6 Local prevalence of Slovene or Croatian colloquial language (Census of 1910)
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the same way the Šepić's argument from 1943 
becomes much more justifiable. He maintained
that the reasonable boundary between Slovenes 
and Croats in Istria should follow the course 
between Umag (Umago) and Klana (cf. Šepić, 
1943 in Kristen 2006: 393). Despite its legitimacy, 
the Šepić's proposal was rejected (ibid.). Instead 
of this on Croatian side, the Krnjević's proposal 
of boundary course roughly between Dragonja 
River and Šapjane was accepted. Not surprisingly, 
because Slovenian side already proposed very 
similar idea (see Guček, 1959). It is hard to answer 
the question why exactly did Slovenian side not 
revise this boundary course immediately after the 
war in 1945, or at least after 1947, when huge 
parts of Slovene speaking territories were already 
assigned to Italy. Though, as Bebler recalls, the 
Yugoslav leadership was occupied by preparation 
for the peace conference with Italy. Indeed, the 
Yugoslav side prepared thorough analyses together 
with thematic mapping already in 1945. However, 
one cannot overlook an important detail that 
the maps were prepared in Ljubljana for "two 
linguistic groups in various time-frames" (Bebler, 
1981: 155). Again, it is evident that the main 
preoccupation of Slovenian part of Yugoslav side 
was the western boundary with Trieste itself.
Methodologically speaking, the Austrian 
censuses had been applying a principle of the 
so-called spoken- or colloquial- language. It 
distinguished four major language groups in Istria 
and in the Austro-Illyrian Littoral respectively 
(i.e. German, Italian, Slovene, Croatian/Serbian, 
other). Hence, the analyzing of any aforementioned 
language combination was and is possible. On 
the other hand, it is also clear that colloquial 
language is something different than ethnicity, 
although they might be interrelated. According 
to these categories, it is absolutely clear that one 
cannot ascribe a personal statement on naming a 
given colloquial language as binding in terms of an 
ethnic affiliation, be it self-ascribed or not. In this
sense it should be stressed that:
"In the time of conception of national ethno-
biographies in 19th century, linguistic structure 
had played a key role as a factor from outside 
ascribed ethnicity. For example, Italianization as a 
result of Romanic dominance, in particular that of 
the north-west Istria, had given rise of ethnic and 
nominal transitions towards Italianness, which had 
been considered as social stratum breakthrough, 
and which could have resulted in improved socio-
economic position of the individual. The rural Slavic 
population was easily equipped with Romanic-
sounding names, however, without simultaneously 
being neither more Italian nor more Slavic! As 
perhaps surprising is coincidence of southern 
border of the Slovenianness with Čakavian-
Slovene in Buzešćina (Pinguente district). [...] I 
see precisely this factor as a relatively rationalized 
basis of ethnic self-affiliation or self-ascription,
albeit unique and unrepeatable as in the case of 
population censuses. The fluctuations of ascribed
affiliations should thus be understood only in the
context of historical moment and under political-
geographical and demographic conditions at that 
time." (Josipovič, 2012) 
Thus, it is understandable that in a given social 
and political setting people change their decisions 
as regards institutionally expressed belonging, 
though being convinced to belong to the "local 
sameness" (cf. Kneževič-Hočevar, 1995). In 
case of Istria, many authors argued that the 
local teachers, preachers, and other distinguished 
personalities could decisively influence the ethnic
or linguistic self-ascription (cf. Beltram, 1986: 
105). But the comparative analyses of the Austrian 
censuses (1880–1910) and the census of Josip 
Roglić (1945), respectively, clearly show that the 
aforementioned process is overestimated. Besides, 
there were many changes after the WWII including 
the major population shifts as well as the shifting 
between the self-ascribed affiliations. As the
analysis of the famous Roglić's census in Istria of 
1945 shows:
"...there was a process of transition [from 
Slovenianness] to Croatianness in Kaštel and 
Savudrija, [but still] one may have noted a significant
and stable number of Slovenes in Savudrija. 
Furthermore, transitions from Croatianness to 
Slovenianness may have been observed in wider 
area of Motovun and Buzet, but also in the 
eastern parts of the so-called High Istria. On the 
other hand, migration dynamics hasn't cover only 
one side of the future inter-republic border. As 
the population has grown on the Croatian side 
(especially the population ethnically affiliated
as Croats), so it has been on the Slovenian side: 
the number of Slovenes has increased either at 
the expense of previously affiliated as Italians or
due to higher fertility of rural population who 
had migrated to the emptied optants' property. 
Owing to the defeat of fascism and the denial 
of once attractive and dominant Italianness, the 
[post-war] ethnic turnover becomes completely 
understandable. Furthermore, the ethnic turnover 
may be produced by the very same people without 
the intervention of ethnically specific coefficients
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of natural change or migration. According to 
the [Austrian] census results, the highest rate 
of fluctuation was registered particularly in the
transitional zone between the Dragonja/Dragogna 
and Mirna/Quieto rivers." (Josipovič, 2012)
Nevertheless, the developments after the 
dissolution of FTT in 1954 did not lead to any 
revision of Slovenian-Croatian internal boundary 
at all. One exception was the Gradin–Pregara area, 
which was officially annexed to Slovenia by federal
decision in 1956 (Josipovič, Kržišnik-Bukić, 
2010: 130–131). 
In the coming decades, the political 
circumstances between Italy and Yugoslavia had 
normalized to the degree when the Osimo Treaties 
were ratified. Prior to this major event between
Italy and Yugoslavia in 1975, there were introduced 
many other steps of political "warming" (e.g. 
border crossing arrangements etc.). By the time 
when Osimo Treaties turned into power the border 
between Italy and Yugoslavia was one of the good 
examples of border permeability in the Cold War 
era. Among many other issues, which cannot 
be described here more thoroughly, the Osimo 
Treaties24 provided for much facilitation (minority 
right, cross-border cooperation, regional initiatives 
etc.) except the most important thing – changes of 
the boundary course. 
Conclusion
As we have seen, the contemporary Slovenian-
Croatian boundary dispute has a complex 
background and already a long beard. The cession 
of the dispute, which has culminated before couple 
of years with sea incidents in and near Piran Bay, to 
the arbitration tribunal may thus be a reasonable 
choice. Despite other, more convenient solutions it 
seemed that both countries have lost the patience 
needed for solving such an aggravating dispute 
on a bilateral basis. One might claim that both 
diplomacies burnt out under the burden either of 
psychological nature (i.e. too high expectations) 
or of a given political setting and finally failed to
render the acceptable solution. After 15 or more 
years of negotiating, something like this could 
be expected. The majority of issues could have 
probably been easily solved, except one – that on 
the maritime sector. The Slovenian aspirations for a 
territorial access to high seas make a Gordian knot 
with the Croatian claims that Croatia territorially 
borders Italy at the sea. Along with both countries' 
geopolitical, economic, and prestigious reasons, 
topped with the Slovenian trauma of unwanted 
outcomes of WWII and with perceived historical 
defeat over Trieste and its vicinity, together with 
Croatia heavily hit by the Homeland War and its 
consequences, the dispute eventually boiled over 
and been relinquished to an arbitration. Though, 
the dispute is far from being impossible to settle, 
bilaterally or otherwise. As Klemenčić and 
Topalović (2009: 319) state: 
"As long as both sides are keen to keep initial 
position, mutually satisfactory solution is hard 
to find. In order to come closer to satisfactory
solution, both sides should change the approach 
and cope with challenges. Croatia is challenged 
to act as a good neighbour and perceive Slovenia 
as geographically disadvantaged state. That 
approach from Croatian side would imply more 
flexibility and, ultimately, readiness to make
concession when maritime delimitation is in 
question. On the other side Slovenia should 
decrease its aspirations because they seem to be 
beyond the framework provided by the UN LOS 
Convention in 1982."
It looks like the arbitration tribunal will 
have to take up these challenges and provide the 
binding solution, one way or another, in a process 
less burdened with the thickness of recent history 
in and around Istria. The quest for the suitable 
boundary course is an arduous task. It has to 
accommodate historical frustrations of both sides 
in disagreement. In a same way, it can produce the 
new frustrations if unsuccessful. Still, there are 
findings from the pertinent analysis, which enable
us to re-experience the enormous difficulties
from the post-war time of boundary-making in 
Istria. Despite the fact that the Slovenian side 
was never really satisfied with the inter-republic
boundary in Istrian sector, it never officially
raised the question on fairness of delimitation on 
Dragonja. It simply coped with the lost Trieste 
without being rewarded with at least a single 
(predominantly) Slovene-speaking settlement on 
the coast of Adriatic. The Slovenian striving at 
least for a strap of genuinely "Slovene" part of 
24 International treaties: Italy and Yugoslavia; Treaty on 
the delimitation of the frontier for the part not indicated 
as such in the Peace Treaty of 10th February 1947 (with 
annexes, exchanges of letters and final act). Signed at
Osimo, Ancona, on 10th November 1975.
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Adriatic coast was deeply enrooted in rank and 
file all the way to the top political establishment.
As the Slovene historian, politician, and editor, 
Dragotin Lončar (1921), would put it almost a 
century ago: "we were everything in one person 
at the time". 
Macro-regional scale is also very important, 
as regards the boundary positioning in Istria. The 
lack of proper Slovenian political entity within 
the Hapsburg Empire forced the Slovenes to seek 
other common denominators. It was to be found in 
the "natural" law based on the spoken language. 
This fluid and highly arbitrary principle restrained
possibilities of incorporating the populations 
considered as "bordering", which explains why 
the Slovenian ethno-centrism at the time did 
not "calculate" with the territory exchanges or 
compensations. From the diachronic perspective 
the latter would be highly expected since the then 
applied principle of ethnic equilibrium. Without 
being really aware of that, the Slovenian side rather 
relied on "purist", though broadly misunderstood, 
Kozler's map of Slovenian Land from 1853 and did 
not raise the question on revision of the Guček–
Babić Partisan's military agreement from 1944. 
As the analysis of the Austrian census data (1880–
1910) has shown, both sides could have agreed for 
other boundary course without raising the question 
on compensating the demographical imbalance 
between Italy and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, 
the specific geopolitical relationships and historical
course of the events, including the creation of the 
buffer state of Free Territory of Trieste, rendered a 
tunnel vision and narrowed the array of possible 
solutions in delimitation between the Slovenes 
and the Croats. It appears that the Slovenian side 
within all the political confusion and the thick 
time-space compression, after 1945 in the Trieste 
area, did above all want only to have a direct way 
or, say, access to the sea – albeit a tight corridor 
at Žavlje/Aquilinia for instance – regardless of the 
access to the international waters since it was not 
at the scope at that time. Dreaming so long for the 
uniting within one "maternal" Yugoslav state, the 
question on an access to international seas was 
simply irrelevant for Slovenes. 
The assumption that the initial Trieste 
international dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia 
and between the Allies has been translated into 
the contemporary dispute between Slovenia and 
Croatia is, as we have shown, by no means far-
fetched. First, the area of the Slovenian-Croatian 
dispute was the part of the same unified territory
as was Trieste itself. The internal delimitation in 
FTT enabled the Yugoslav side to control larger 
portion (the Zone B) of the territory, however less 
populated compared to the Zone A including the 
city of Trieste. The Zone B was governed from 
Koper/Capodistria in the far north of the Zone. 
It was, therefore, logical to organize the Yugoslav 
operated "Istrian County" into two subsequent 
districts of Koper and Buje. The line of separation 
was the valley of Dragonja, partly because it was 
previously (from 1944) used for the military 
delimitation between Slovene and the Croatian 
Partisan troops. Only the dissolution of Koper's 
Istrian County in 1952 and reorganization into 
two districts gave way to separate governing of 
Koper District and Buje District respectively, 
which laid the foundations of what later became 
the republic boundary around Dragonja River. At 
the time it was by no means clear about the future 
status of the whole FTT. In this context, it is much 
more understandable why Slovenian side decided 
not to problematize Dragonja instead of insisting 
on Mirna or proposing other solutions. We have 
shown by statistical-demographic analysis that 
Slovenian side had had a good deal of evidence 
to propose another boundary course, but it had 
not done so. 
And second, if it was somewhat logical that due 
to the international balance of power Yugoslavia 
could not won all the territories inhabited by 
the Slovene-speaking population western from 
the former Austro-Hungarian boundary towards 
Italy, then at least Trieste itself could have been 
proper satisfaction or compensation. Expectations 
of the Slovenian that Yugoslavia was in the 
position to gain the whole FTT turned out to be 
unrealistic. The dismissal of FTT and the whole 
boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia was finally
ascertained in 1975 by the Osimo Treaties. After 
1991 Slovenia and Croatia realized that the Istrian 
sector of the boundary is the most problematic 
since it is directly connected with the question of 
maritime delimitation of once Yugoslav territorial 
waters. Facing the possibility of losing the 
territorial junction to high seas, and symbolically 
traumatized by perceived heavy historical defeats, 
Slovenia opened up the question of "moral debt" of 
Croatia. The awareness of Croatian side certainly 
included that perspective, so both sides reached 
a very important Drnovšek-Račan agreement 
in 2001. The agreement failed to be ratified in
Croatian Parliament and thus started the second 
decade of bilateral negotiations to come. In spite 
of a possible good will, neither of sides was ready 
to withdraw, for many reasons (local political 
42
D. Josipovič Geoadria 17/1 (2012) 25-43
situation, prestige, power relations etc.), which 
eventually led to the compromise in a shape of the 
agreement on arbitration.
Given that both countries were inclined to react 
emotionally (i.e. triggered conflicts, official notes,
attitudes at the questions of Yugoslav succession, 
banking, nuclear power-plant etc.) for many 
different reasons, one cannot automatically rule 
out the psychological effects of traumatization 
(caused by the loss of Trieste for example), and the 
pertinent transmission of trauma. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allgemeines Verzeichnis der Ortsgemeinden und Ortschaften Österreichs, 1915, Vienna. 
Babič, B. (1982): Primorska ni klonila (The Slovene Littoral didn't succumb), Založba Lipa, Koper, 412. 
Ballinger, P. (2003): History in Exile, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 328.
Bebler, A. (1981): Čez drn in strn, Založba Lipa, Koper, 328.
Beltram, J. (1986): Pomlad v Istri, Založba Lipa, Koper, 359.
Bertić, I. (1987): Veliki geografski atlas Jugoslavije, Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, Zagreb.
Courtenay, J. B. de (1998): Degli Slavi in Italia / O Slovanih v Italiji, Lipa, Špeter Slovenov / S. Pietro al 
Natisone, 109.
Dukovski, D. (2011): Hrvatsko-slovenski odnosi i pitanje razgraničenja u Istri (1900.- 2002.), In: Darovec, 
D., Strčić, P. (Eds.), Slovensko-hrvaško sosedstvo / Hrvatsko-slovensko susjedstvo, 47-66.
Frattini, F. (2009): New responses from Italy about the movie "Triest is Ours!", http:// www.siol.net/
Kultura/Novice/2009/11/V_Italiji_novi_odzivi_na_film_Trst_je_nas.aspx. (03.06.2011)
Glenny, M. (1999): The Balkans: nationalism, war, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999, New York, Penguin 
Books, 726.
Guček, M. (1959): Počakaj do prihodnje pomladi, Lipa, Koper/Capodistria, 270.
Harvey, D. (1989 [1990]): The Condition of Posmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origin of Cultural 
Change, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 379.
Josipovič, D. (2006): Učinki priseljevanja v Slovenijo po drugi svetovni vojni, Založba ZRC, Ljubljana, 
348.
Josipovič, D. Kržišnik-Bukić, V. (2010): Slovensko-hrvaški obmejni proctor: etnične vzporednice med 
popisi prebivalstva po letu 1991., Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, 252.
Josipovič, D. (2011): Slovensko-hrvaška meja: izbrane problematizacije, In: Darovec, D., Strčić, P. (Eds.), 
Slovensko-hrvaško sosedstvo / Hrvatsko-slovensko susjedstvo, 227-248.
Josipovič, D. (2012): Constructing the ethnic identity in Istria: shifting between Slovenianness and 
Croatianness, Autre Terre, in print.
Kacin-Wohinc, M., Pirjevec, J. (2000): Zgodovina Slovencev v Italiji 1866-2000, Nova revija, Ljubljana, 
336.
Kalc-Hafner, A. (2005): Nasledstvo mednarodnih pogodb, ki jih je ratificirala bivša SFRJ, In: Krnel-
Umek, Duša (Ed.), Slovensko-Hrvaška meja v Istri - Preteklost in sedanjost, Ljubljana, Ljudska čebela, 
33-38.
Kneževič-Hočevar, D. (1995): The upper Kolpa River Valley: the impact of the new international border, 
Anthropological Notebooks 1/1, 87–93. 
Kozler, P. (1853): Zemljovid Slovenske dežele in pokrajin, Vienna, cartographic material.
Kozler, P. (1854): Kratek slovenski zemljopis in pregled politične in pravosodne razdelitve Ilirskega 
kraljestva in Štajerskega vojvodstva, Vienna, 57. 
Krnel-Umek, Duša (Ed.), Slovensko-Hrvaška meja v Istri - Preteklost in sedanjost, Ljubljana, Ljudska 
čebela.
43
D. Josipovič Geoadria 17/1 (2012) 25-43
Kristen, S. (2006): Meje in misije: dileme slovensko-hrvaške razmejitve v Istri v vojaškem, političnem in 
diplomatskem metežu II. svetovne vojne, Ljubljana, Založba 2000, 412.
Lončar, D. (1921): Politično življenje Slovencev (od 4. januarja 1797. do 6. januarja 1919. leta), Slovenska 
Matica, Ljubljana, 177 ps.
Manin, M. (2006): On Human Losses and the Exodus, Review of Croatian History, 2/1, 73-88.
Marin, L. (1998): Dogovor o organizacijsko-teritorialni (vojaškopravni) razmejitvi je ostal temelj za poznejšo 
mejo med republikama, In: Rajšp et al. (Eds.), Vprašanje oblikovanja slovenskega etničnega in državnega 
prostora s posebnim poudarkom na slovensko-hrvaški meji v Istri, Ljubljana, Umetnostnozgodovinski 
inštitut Franceta Steleta ZRC SAZU, 45-68.
Massey, D. (1993): Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place, In Bird, J., Curtis, B., Putnam, T., 
Robertson, G., and Tickner, L. (Eds.), Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change, Routledge, 
London, 59–69.
Melik, A. (1960): Slovensko Primorje, Slovenska Matica, Ljubljana, 548.
Mihelič, D. (2007): Ribič, kje zdaj tvoja barka pluje?, Koper/Capodistria, Založba Annales, 216.
Pavić, R. (2010): Analysis of "Protocol" about the border between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro, 
Geoadria 15/2, 287-303.
Pirjevec, J. (2007): "Trst je naš!": boj Slovencev za morje (1848-1954), Nova revija, 542. 
Roglić, J. (1946): Le Recensement de 1910: ses methods et son application dans la Marche Julienne, 2nd 
Edition, Institute Adriatique, Sušak, 74. 
Rutar, S. (1899 [1998]): Beneška Slovenija: prirodoznanski in zgodovinski opis, Združenje Evgen Blankin 
/ Associazione Evgen Blankin, Čedad / Cividale del Friuli, 188. 
Sassen, S. (1999): Embedding the global in the national: implications for the role of the state, In: Smith, D. A., 
Solinger, D. J., Topik, S. (Eds.), States and sovereignty in the global economy, Routledge, London, 158-171.
Selan, I., Bohinec, V., Planina, F. (1952): Slovensko Primorje, Komite za turizem in gostinstvo pri vladi 
LR Slovenije, Ljubljana, cartographic material.
Seton-Watson, H. (1951): The East European Revolution, Frederick A. Prager, New York, 421.
Special-Orts-Repertorium des österreichisch-illyrischen Küstenlandes... Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 
1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, K. K. statistichen Central-Commission, Vienna, 1884, 1894, 1905, 1918. 
Stranj, P. (1999): Slovensko prebivalstvo Furlanije Julijske Krajine v družbeni in zgodovinski perspektivi, 
Slori, Trst/Trieste, 366. 
Troha, N. (1999): Komu Trst: Slovenci in Italijani med dvema državama, Modrijan, Ljubljana, 327. 
Virc, Ž. (2009): Trst je naš!, A short movie, AGRFT, Ljubljana.

